Dangerous Triangle: Vietnam, the US and China in the South China Sea

Lyle Goldstein, PhD
lyle.j.goldstein@gmail.com

Note: This presentation reflects the personal views of the author and not the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other entity of the U.S. Government.
碧海舞蛟龙
中国核潜艇的技术进步与展望

Technical Advances of and Prospects for Chinese Nuclear-powered Submarine

采用深海探测设备的测量控制，确保水下安全

093G（改）攻击核潜艇设计图

093G的研制总装与091的改进类似，即采用最新技术和第代新型先进技术对093型艇进行现代化改造，使其整体技术水平和作战性能达到或超过国外第二代攻击核潜艇同期改进型号，特别是攻击力、探测能力、安全性方面比093型有了很大的提高。不过，由于受主级设计、核反应堆技术水平及输出功率等方面的影响，093G这种改进并不是在091型基础上“跨代”的程度，相对"海狼”级、“基洛”级、“奥洛夫”级这些第四代攻击型核潜艇仍然存在着差距。直至目前国仍未掌握可靠的攻击核潜艇”跨代“的关键技术。
能力的稳定性。

“便宜”的美国“民兵”系列
洲际导弹有巨大的毁灭能力，可以瞬间做到真正的国家灭种，因此成为国际战略平衡的基石和世界大国必不可少的装备。但洲际导弹极为昂贵，无论是冷战时期的超级大国，还是后进国家如中国，都为研制和装备洲际导弹花费了天文数字的资金，而且核导弹及其支持系统的维护升级同样昂贵。冷战后，美俄再也无力负担这种奢侈的“玩具”，正在不断减少核弹头和洲际导弹的数量。

中国在拥有核力量之初，就制定了不首先使用核武器的原则，保持合理较低的核武器数量，避免了过大的投入。但即便如此，“东风”5到“东风”31A、乃至传说中的“东风”41和“巨浪”2，都是中国军队装备序列中价格昂贵、研制周期最长的装备之一。如果综合国力不够强大，是无力负担这种
黄岩岛事件来龙去脉

4月10日，菲律宾海军“德尔皮拉尔”号闯入黄岩岛海域，并在该海域进行非法越界警戒。4月11日，中国海军177号“黄海”号、116号“千岛湖”号和817号“湖光”号舰船对菲海军进行了警告。4月13日，在中国护航编队的严密监视下，菲律宾军舰离开黄岩岛海域。4月15日，外交部新闻发言人刘为民表示，中方要求菲律宾立即离开黄岩岛海域。

4月18日，中国海军第二十二批护航编队与菲律宾海军进行首次海上联合演习。

4月20日，中国海军第二十二批护航编队赴黄岩岛海域警戒。

4月22日，中国海军第二十二批护航编队第二梯队与菲律宾海军举行海上联合演习。

4月23日，中国海军第二十二批护航编队与菲律宾海军举行第二次联合演习。

4月25日，中国海军第二十二批护航编队进入黄岩岛海域。
SOUTH CHINA SEA ‘PARACELS’ CRISIS
May 2014
Q. and A.: Lyle Goldstein on China and the Vietnamese Military

By Jane Perlez

JULY 5, 2014 4:33 PM
10 Comments

A Vietnamese coast guard vessel, right, followed a Chinese coast guard ship in disputed waters in the South China Sea in May. Associated Press/Reuters

Sinosphere, the China blog of The New York Times, delivers intimate, authoritative coverage of the planet’s most populous nation and its relationship with the rest of the world. Drawing on timely, engaging dispatches from The Times’ distinguished team of China correspondents, this blog brings readers into the debates and discussions taking place inside a fast-changing country and details the cultural, economic and political developments shaping the lives of 1.3 billion people.
China's Nightmare: Vietnam's New Killer Submarines

Vietnam's new submarines could alter the balance in the South China Sea quite dramatically.

Lyle J. Goldstein
March 29, 2015
It is apparent that Vietnam enjoys a rather decent space for [strategic] maneuver, compared with China which confronts the difficult issue of cross-strait unification, so Vietnam therefore in respect to the South China Sea issue enjoys the initiative.

Although Vietnam has been equipped with two submarines ... nevertheless, this small force of special submarines did not necessarily confer significant submarine experience or talent ... Vietnam has undertaken unilateral military, economic and cultural activities that constitute invasion of the South Sea area by osmosis. Preparations by the Chinese side are inevitable ...
Case 2: Chinese Views of the Vietnam Navy

“SMALL COUNTRY, SCANT MILITARY: A SURVEY OF VIETNAM’S NAVAL COMBAT FORCES”

“Although Vietnam over the last few years has purchased relatively advanced weapons, it still has an incomplete system. The biggest gap is that there is no broad area targeting system, limiting the [Vietnam Navy’s] actual combat power.”

“For quite a while, Vietnam’s navy building strategy has followed the old strategy of ‘air, submarines, and fast boats.’”
“I think we can give Vietnam a little more time ... and hope that they slowly come to understand. But if they continue to be confused, then we have the means to cope with their confusion.”
“If we consider the other side 'taking the first shot', well then there is no harm in fighting. This fight would not be on a large scale, at most it might be considered a military clash, nothing more, and it will not fundamentally resolve the South China Sea question. However, for China this will create in foreign thinking an unequivocal symbol. In order to resolve such rivalries in the future, it will have enormous, positive value.”
Case 2: Chinese Views of the Vietnam Navy

“[1988] was a great victory ... The harsh methods proved an extremely ideal choice. To avoid [the use of force] or to excessively employ it are both unacceptable ...”

“During the Nansha Sea Battle, the thing we feared most was not Vietnam’s surface vessels, but rather their aircraft... If at that time, China had an aircraft carrier nearby, we would not have had to fear Vietnam’s air force. The Chinese aircraft carrier will resolve the problem. We would seize air superiority and the Vietnamese planes would not dare to take off.”

October 2011 issue, Modern Ships
“THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE: EACH SIDE MUST ACT WITH CAUTION”

“We in China cannot have restraint without any limits. If Vietnam believes that it can treat Chinese forbearance like so much salt in the South China Sea with its penchant to say anything, then Hanoi has indeed made a strategic error in judgment.”
Case 2: Chinese Views of the Vietnam Navy

PLA Navy RADM Yin Zhuo (ret.)

“Pulling the Big Powers to Stir the South China Sea: Vietnam Seeks to Guard the Land While Advancing at Sea”

“Japan Will Aid Vietnam by Training its Coast Guard Personnel”
Predicted Methods of Vietnamese Employment:

- Deterrence
- Ambush
- Blockade
- Local Superiority

“…with the advantage of constructing large numbers [of Type 056A light frigates], this should be sufficient to cope with Vietnam’s conventional submarines.”
“Everyone should study the UK’s determination to maintain sovereignty over the Falklands. Those islands are more than 13,000 km from the UK, but shall we suppose we are not up to defending Huangyan Island just a few hundred kilometers from our coast! Of course, multiple methods can be employed – the military instrument, and also the diplomatic one.”

“... government patrol ships are regularizing patrol surveillance. This should not be seen as a change of posture ... The earlier stance of ‘not going’ was due to a lack of capability. Now we are “going” to enforce sovereignty. This should not surprise or alarm anyone, nor do they have the right to ‘protest.’"
“Regarding the Huangyan Island issue, China has been patient not weak, but restrained. However, if there is someone who mistakes China’s good intentions for weakness ... viewing China as a ‘paper tiger’. Then, he is absolutely wrong.”

“China does not seek an incident, but also does not fear an incident. [China] is peace loving but also does not dread resorting to force.”
Huangyan Model and the Shift of China’s Maritime Strategy

Zhang Jie

(National Institute of International Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100007, China)

Keywords: Huangyan Model; Maritime Rights; the South China Sea Issue; Policy Changes

Abstract: In dealing with Huangyan Island dispute and Disooy Island dispute, a new defense model—Huangyan Model has been explored by China. This model means: It sees non-military conflict as the bottom line to attain effective control over the disputed shoal and its surrounding waters by means of diplomacy, economy and civilian maritime force, etc. This model suggests that China’s maritime policy has shifted fundamentally from keeping a low profile to becoming more proactive. This change is not paroxysmal but reasonable and inevitable. In future, China should make out its ocean strategy and strengthen its maritime force in order to become an ocean power.

2012年，菲律宾和日本先后在黄岩岛与钓鱼岛挑起争端。在应争端的过程中，中国综合运用行政、外交和经济等手段，并以军事力量为后援，实现了对黄岩岛的完全控制，而其后中国在钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿与日本共同行使管辖权，大大改变了过去中国在上述两岛的被动局面。中国通过成功处理这两争端形成的新海洋维权方式被称为“黄岩岛模式”。

那么，与过去的维权模式相比，“黄岩岛模式”具有哪些新特点？这一模式是否适用于未来不去的新的海洋维权转向积极有为？如果答案是肯定的，这种转变是突变性的还是渐变完成的，引起这种转变的原因是什么？未来，中国又应该采取哪些举措完善“黄岩岛模式”，维护中国的海洋权益呢？这是本文试图探讨的主要内容。

一 黄岩岛对峙：过程、特征及其意义

黄岩岛（Scarborough Shoal）又名民主礁，位于东经117°51’、北纬15°07’，属于中国西沙群岛之一
with the military instrument as the background shield for the policy, there was a breakthrough in moving beyond the previous practice of using diplomacy as the only tool to resolve disputes.

“Before 2009 was the period of keeping a low profile and biding our time” ... [but] the result was the significant weakening of foreign policy. [Chinese] foreign policy concessions did not yield regional stability, quite the contrary ...
“THE ‘FIVE NO’S’ POLICY: ANALYSIS OF AMERICA’S SOUTH CHINA SEA POLICY”

1. No taking sides
2. No blocking FoN
3. No use of force

“This was the first time that the US government had openly declared that the ‘nine dashed line’ is inconsistent with international law, thus rejecting China’s historic claim, and also indicating a major revision in America’s policy in the South China Sea.”

“... the US has ... added two new policies against China’s long-standing position ...

[T]he US opposes sovereignty claims based on historical rights, and opposes negotiating the disputes in bilateral ways.”

“... the US has openly opposed Chinese efforts to create platforms for bilateral negotiated resolution of South China Sea maritime disputes, thus placing continuous pressure on China, and demanding that China initiate multilateral negotiations with ASEAN.”
“If there are never any concessions and compromises, there is simply no possibility of reaching a compromise on border issues.”

RADM Yin Zhuo
Xinhua, 4 Jan 2011
"Now in our country there is a belief that border questions can only be resolved through war, and there is the related idea that the country must make strong demands. But these ideas have a mistaken understanding of history... The press and some scholars insist on the use of 'force'... resulting in the worship of the "hardliners" from the past, and criticism of current "weakness." This approach neither corresponds to the facts, nor can it assist the comprehensive resolution of these problems."
Cooperation Spiral: Southeast Asia

End active military cooperation with the Philippines and Indonesia

Initiate substantive joint development under the principle of equality

Clarify U-shaped claim and make consistent with UN Law of the Sea

Open Haman Island–Yalong Bay naval complex to annual visit by ASEAN states

Propose joint counterpiracy patrol in Malacca Strait

Welcome major Chinese military presence at CAEAT exercise

End active military cooperation with Vietnam

Reduce surveillance missions in northern part of South China Sea

Propose Southeast Asia Coast Guard Forum

Propose substantive collaboration in maritime cooperation
Initiate substantive joint development under the principle of equality
以平等原则共同开发南海资源

Clarify U-shaped claim and make consistent with UN Law of the Sea
澄清九断线的性质，要符合联合国海洋法公约规定

Open Hainan Island—Yalong Bay naval complex to annual visit by ASEAN states

End active military cooperation with Vietnam
结束与越南的军事合作

Endorse China as claimant and support bilateral negotiations
承认中国与其他的争论国的平等地位，支持双边谈判形式

Reduce surveillance missions in northern part of South China Sea
减少在南海北部的侦察活动
Comments / Questions?
“International anti-China forces are still using the rivalry over the jurisdiction of maritime rights in the Spratly Islands to spoil our relations with neighboring states and further complicating the situation in the South China Sea. ... the United States as the fundamental anti-Chinese force ... may seek to precipitate a crisis, hoping that internal difficulties could facilitate foreign aggression, or that foreign aggression could cause internal anxiety.”

“With respect to activities in the South Sea ... [we need to] build the legal basis for the use of non-peaceful means to resolve the rivalry over maritime rights. We are peace-loving ... but we also need to make the appropriate plans and preparations.”
ADS is now being researched by the USN as a rapidly deployable, highly capable, undersea surveillance system... and can be extremely effective against either nuclear submarines or very quiet diesel submarines.

"China’s fixed type undersea surveillance system is also continuously developing... since 1996. ... In 2005 near Qingdao a comprehensive undersea surveillance system was tested."
“I believe the individual countries are actually playing with fire, and I hope the fire will not be drawn to the United States.”
“Examining our Country’s New Security Space from the Vantage Point of the South China Sea Air Intercept”

“… the signals intelligence gathered over a long period of time could have significant importance during war time.”

“… the Chinese side’s request to the US to reduce surveillance operations are rejected … [The US] planes do not enter our country, but the electro-magnetic waves come into our country. [This] … is a weapon, and also a military tool. So, you have invaded us! … In fact, these are all war operations.”